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Empirical studies in corporate finance have long been focused on the role of banks in 
reducing the costs of financial distress.    The environment and events in Japan provide 
a “natural experiment” that allows such empirical studies.  The number of 
bankruptcies steadily increased throughout the 1990s, and peaked in 2000.  During 
this period, Japan’s banking sector, in contrast, faced considerable problems regarding 
the disposal of their bad loans.    The purpose of this paper is to investigate how various 
measures of bank health and how defaults of major trading partners affected the 
probability of bankruptcy among medium-size firms in Japan.    Using probit models, we 
examine the causes of bankruptcy for unlisted Japanese companies in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s.  We find that several measures of bank-specific financial health have 
had significant impacts on a borrower’s probability of bankruptcy, even when observable 
characteristics relating to these borrower’s financial variables are controlled.  In 
particular, a close bank-firm relationship—which usually reduces the probability of 
bankruptcy—exacerbates the impacts of a financial crisis, which substantially damages 
other bank health measures as well.     
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 11. Introduction 
Empirical studies in corporate finance have long been focused on the role of banks in 
reducing the costs of financial distress.  One strand of research reveals indirect 
evidence on the benefits of close bank-firm relationships.  Using firm-level data in 
Japan, Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990) demonstrated the role of banks in 
reducing the costs of financial distress for firms that are members of a keiretsu 
(corporate group linked through one main bank).  The role of the main bank is 
particularly important during times of distress, when it changes the affiliated firm’s 
management and board directors (Kang and Shivdasani [1995]; Morck and Nakamura 
[1999]).  Information gathering and monitoring performed by banks may help to 
overcome informational “free-rider” problems associated with diffuse debt-holding.  
Firms with strong bank-firm relationships may be better able to overcome financial 
distress, which gives such firms a more stable, informed, and committed source of 
financing (Hall and Weinstein [2000]).    Using data on small U.S. firms, authors such as 
Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell (1995) showed that a close bank 
relationship increases credit availability for small borrowers.  Several other studies 
also suggest that small businesses benefit from a close bank relationship in European 
countries.1
Banking relationships have a cost, however, when bank health is largely impaired.  
In particular, the so-called “credit hypothesis” proposed that banking crises cause 
financial disintermediation and can have severe macroeconomic consequences.   
Bernanke (1983) is a seminal work for the literature and showed that bank failures had 
contributed to the Great Depression in the United States.  Many of the earlier studies 
tested the credit hypothesis from a macro (economy-wide) perspective (see, among 
others, Anari, Kolari, and Mason (2005) and the reference therein).    But to explore the 
robustness of the hypothesis, it is equally important to test it from a micro (firm level) 
perspective.  Deteriorating bank health would have much larger impacts on small and 
medium firms that relied on a close bank relationship in reducing the costs of financial 
distress.  This paper follows this new approach by using micro data from small and 
medium firms. 
In the following analysis, we investigate how the financial health of banks, as well as 
how the defaults of major trading partners, affected the probability of bankruptcy of 
medium size firms in Japan.    The environment and events in Japan provide a “natural 
experiment” that allows such empirical testing.    First, because of the importance of the 
main bank system, many Japanese firms rely heavily on bank finance.  While the role 
                                                  
1 See, for example, Harhoff and Körting (1998) and Ferri and Messori (2000). 
 2of banks became relatively smaller for larger companies in the 1990s, banks maintained 
a dominant role in the financing of smaller firms.  Second, Japan experienced a 
dramatic collapse in the financial condition of its banking system in the 1990s.  We 
should thus be better able to identify the impacts of negative shocks on default risk 
when a large amount of losses on disposal of non-performing loans damaged the 
financial health of many banks in the late 1990s.    Third, suitable data are available to 
test the hypothesis based on bank-level and firm-level data.  We obtained a detailed 
list of major lenders for each unlisted company from the Tokyo Shoko Research (TSR) 
Database Service.    We then matched borrowers’ financial data to the relevant financial 
data of the “main banks.”     
  As a firm works more closely with a bank, it finds it harder to raise funds through 
other means; outside fundraising may also be held up by the bank (Sharpe [1990], Rajan 
[1992]).    The proprietary information about borrowers that banks obtain through their 
relationships may give them an information monopoly.  To the extent that the 
information monopoly makes switching the bank-firm relationship difficult, 
bank-specific financial health might affect a borrower’s cost of funds, even when 
observable characteristics relating to borrower risk are controlled.  While bank-firm 
relationships have been found to be important in the United States, such links are 
likely to be even more important in a country such as Japan, which is is far more reliant 
on bank financing.     
  A strand of empirical research has supported the conclusion that close bank 
relationships were a liability when bank health deteriorated in Japan.  Gibson (1995) 
found that firm investment was sensitive to the main bank’s rating.  Kang and Stulz 
(2000) showed that firms that relied more on bank finance suffered significantly larger 
wealth losses during the first three years of the 1990s.  Klein, Peek, and Rosengren 
(2002) found that the financial difficulties of Japanese banks reduced the number of 
FDI projects by Japanese firms into the United States.2  All of these studies, however, 
used the data set on listed firms, so that their implications were relevant only for large 
firms in Japan.  Previous studies thus say little about the extent of impacts bank 
health had on the default risk of small and medium borrowers.  The use of firm-level 
data of unlisted firms is useful in detecting the effects of bank health on its borrower’s 
default risk, because unlisted firms not only have stronger reliance on bank finance but 
also face higher default risk.    In addition, reverse causality from firms to banks will be 
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explored the existence of “capital crunch” by using the data of individual Japanese 
banks. 
 3less of a problem in a firm-level regression for unlisted firms than for listed firms.    The 
firm’s default may damage the bank’s financial health if the firm’s loans from its bank 
were a substantial chunk of the bank’s capital.  This is likely for some listed firms but 
less likely for unlisted firms.  The use of unlisted firms’ data thus allows us to avoid 
possible simultaneous bias without using ad hoc instrument variables. 
  In investigating the impacts of bank health on the probability of bankruptcy, we 
explore the causes of two types of bankruptcy: "bankruptcy for liquidation purposes" 
aimed at company liquidation (extinction) and "bankruptcy for reconstruction purposes" 
whereby the company pays off its debts while remaining in business.  By  incorporating 
recent contributions on multinomial probit models, we estimate a trinomial probit 
model as well as a binominal probit model for a sample of 6,266 unlisted Japanese 
companies in the late 1990s and the early 2000s.  Previous empirical studies have 
found that a company is more likely to fail if it is unprofitable, highly leveraged, and 
suffers from cash-flow difficulties.3  Our probit models confirm this standard result.  
We find, however, that several measures of bank-specific financial health as well as 
defaults of major trading partners have additional impacts on a borrower’s probability 
of bankruptcy, even when observable characteristics relating to this borrower’s financial 
variables are controlled.     
  In previous literature, several studies have investigated the performances of small 
and medium firms using the firm-level data of unlisted firms in Japan.  In particular, 
authors such as Omura et al. (2002) and Saito and Tachibanaki (2004) investigated the 
determinants of defaults of unlisted firms in Japan.  These previous studies, however, 
did not explore the bank effects on borrowers’ performances by using a matched sample 
of borrowers and banks.4  Our study is thus new in showing that several measures on 
bank-specific financial health, such as ratios of nonperforming loans, have additional 
impacts on a borrower’s probability of bankruptcy in Japan. 
    We use three alternative measures to measure bank health: (i) ratios of 
nonperforming loans (NPLs), (ii) a relative measure of bank stock valuation, and (iii) 
bank failures.  For comparison, we also investigate the impacts of defaults of parent 
companies and other major trade partners.  Among the three bank health measures, 
ratios of NPLs are backward-looking, and are only loosely related to a bank’s economic 
                                                  
3 Altman (1968) is one of the earliest studies.  Recent  contributions  include  Lennox 
(1999), Shumway (2001), and Hillegeist, Keating, Cram, and Lundstedt (2003). 
4 Schaede (2005) discussed the financial system on small-firm financing in Japan.   
Fukuda, Kasuya, and Nakajima (2005) investigated the relationship between financial 
distress and corporate investment in Japan by using firm-level data.    They did not, 
however, examine the impacts of bank health on borrowers’ default risk. 
 4value.  We, in contrast, find that the backward-looking measure had as many 
significant impacts as the forward-looking stock market valuation did.  This suggests 
that deterioration of both backward-looking and forward-looking measures had been 
important in tightening the banks’ lending attitudes and in increasing the borrowers’ 
default risk under the financial turbulence in Japan.    Failures of the main banks had a 
positive but less- significant impact on a borrower’s probability of bankruptcy.   
Defaults of parent companies and other major trading partners, however, had very large 
impacts on a borrower’s probability of bankruptcy.  During the period of financial 
turbulence, small firms could have financial support from the government when the 
main bank failed.  But that was not the case when parent companies defaulted.  This 
implies that defaults of non-financial firms had larger contagious effects in increasing 
the default risk of vertically related smaller firms in the late 1990s and early 2000s in 
Japan. 
  A noteworthy finding in the paper is that multiple banking relationships had two 
opposite impacts on a borrower’s probability of bankruptcy.  We find that multiple 
bank relationships worsened the default risk of borrowing firms but reduced the 
negative impacts of impaired bank health.    The result is a reconfirmation of a previous 
finding by Houston and James (2001), which investigated a similar issue in a different 
framework.  A bank-firm relationship becomes loose when the firm borrows from 
multiple banks.  To the extent that the relation reduces the costs of financial distress, 
the number of bank lenders would have a negative correlation with the probability of 
bankruptcy.  However, a hold-up problem under a close bank-firm relationship 
intensifies the link between bank-specific financial health and a borrower’s cost of funds.   
The impacts of the bank health measures under the financial crisis would thus be 
mitigated when the number of bank lenders is large.     
    Our paper proceeds as follows.    After presenting our hypothesis in Section 2, Section 
3 specifies the basic model and explains our data.    Section 4 reports our main empirical 
results.    Section 5 provides our interpretations on the marginal impacts of bank health 
deterioration on bankruptcy probabilities.  Section 6 explores the impacts of multiple 
banking relationships.  Section 7 discusses predictability of our probit models, and  
Section 8 summarizes our main results and considers their implications. 
 
 
2.  Outline  of  the  Model 
(1) Motivation and Hypothesis 
After the crash of the stock market, the number of bankruptcies in Japan steadily 
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firms peaked in 2000 (see Figure 1).  The number of bankruptcies was very moderate 
for listed companies.  In contrast, there were dramatic increases in bankruptcies 
among small and medium firms in the late 1990s and early 2000s.  The low 
profitability of small and medium firms might be one source of the problem. The strong 
reliance on bank finance could, however, be another source that diminishes access to 
alternative sources of funding.     
The “Tankan Survey” of the Bank of Japan shows that the lending attitudes of 
financial institutions became very tight in the late 1990s.  The lending attitudes for 
large companies were also tight but only temporarily.  Restrictive attitudes toward 
small and medium companies, in contrast, persisted and showed slow recovery 
throughout the 1990s and early 2000s (see Figure 2).    Evidence supports the view that 
small and medium companies have more serious problems in finding alternative sources 
of funding during financial turbulence. 
  Since the early 1990s, the Japanese banking sector had faced considerable problems 
disposing loans that had gone bad.  The problems became particularly serious in the 
late 1990s, when several major financial institutions turned out to be in default.  To 
the extent that bank health does matter, deterioration of bank health would tighten the 
bank’s lending attitude, and might increase the borrowers’ default risk, particularly 
among smaller firms.  The hypothesis we will test in the following analysis is the 
extent of the impact several measures of bank health had on the probability of 
bankruptcy of unlisted firms in Japan in the late 1990s and early 2000s.  We test 
directly the effects of a variety of bank health measures on default risks of unlisted 
borrowing firms in Japan.    According to previous empirical studies, a firm has a larger 
default risk when it has a larger debt-asset ratio, larger interest payments, and smaller 
profits.  In the following model, we include these borrower’s financial variables as 
benchmark explanatory variables.  We then add several bank-related variables to 
allow the identity of its main bank to affect a firm’s default risk. 
 
(2) Definition of Bankruptcy 
To measure default risk, we define bankruptcy as "a company that is experiencing 
difficulties in its management and that can no longer discharge the liabilities it must 
pay off."5  We divide bankruptcy into two categories: "bankruptcy for liquidation 
                                                  
5 More specifically, we define "bankruptcy" in the event that a company is recognized as 
corresponding to any of the following seven cases: (1) drawing unpaid notes two times 
and business is suspended, (2) dissolution of the company (when the representative 
admits to being bankrupt), (3) applying for the Corporate Rehabilitation Law, (4) 
 6purposes" and "bankruptcy for reconstruction purposes."  In the classification, 
“bankruptcy for liquidation purposes” includes "bankruptcy," "special liquidation," and 
most cases of voluntary liquidation, while “bankruptcy for reconstruction purposes” 
includes "the Corporate Reorganization Act," "the Civil Reorganization Act," 
"Commercial Law Dissolution,” and a small part of voluntary liquidation.  The former 
corresponds to Chapter 7 in U.S. bankruptcy law, and the latter to Chapter 11.  The 
classification follows that of TSR Database Service.  In the Unites States, there are a 
number of studies that compared the costs of the two types of bankruptcies: Chapter 7 
vs. Chapter 11.6    The evidence suggests that Chapter 11 cases were better at retaining 
value throughout the bankruptcy process.  Exploring the sources of two types of 
bankruptcies has important implications.   
 
(3) Alternative Measures of Bank Health 
There are several alternative proxies to measure bank health.  In the following 
analysis, we use three bank health measures: (i) ratios of nonperforming loans (NPLs), 
(ii) a relative measure of bank stock valuation, and (iii) bank failures.7  The first 
measure of bank health is ratios of NPLs.  In Japan, the banks sometimes 
underreported the amount of nonperforming loans on their book to conceal the true 
extent of their problems.    However, nonperforming loans continued to accumulate until 
2001, causing huge losses on the disposal of non-performing loans for the banks.  As a 
result, NPL ratios were regarded as an important indicator to measure bank health 
throughout the 1990s and into the early 2000s.  In particular, the Japanese 
government repeatedly warned the banks that it was imperative to solve the 
non-performing loans problems to recover confidence in Japan’s financial system.    It is 
thus highly possible that increases in NPL ratios would increase borrowers’ default risk 
through the tightening of lending attitudes among banks.     
The second measure is a relative measure of bank stock valuation.  We use a proxy 
that measures how a bank’s stock price had changed after a benchmark year.  The 
                                                                                                                                                  
applying for dissolution arrangement under the Commercial Code, (5) applying for the 
Civil Rehabilitation Law, (6) applying for bankruptcy, and (7) applying for 
commencement of special liquidation proceedings to the court.    The above can be 
classified broadly into "voluntary liquidation," consisting of (1) and (2), and " legal 
liquidation," consisting of (3) and (4). 
6 Some recent contributions include Bris, Welch, and Zhu (2004). 
7 Risk-based bank capital asset ratios could be another bank health measure. But the 
ratios had been highly contaminated measures in Japan because the government not 
only changed the definitions frequently but also allowed a lot of arbitrary accounting to 
boost those ratios. 
 7benchmark year is 1990, after which Japanese stock prices started to collapse.  The 
relative stock valuation is thus an indicator of how the bank’s market valuation had 
changed after the prolonged leak of speculative bubbles.  While the ratios of NPLs are 
backward-looking, stock prices are forward-looking.  The forward-looking market 
valuation of a bank is sometimes volatile, and can deviate from its real economic value.   
However, the forward-looking measure has a preferable property, since what matters to 
the firm is the availability of the bank’s help if it gets into financial distress.     
  The third measure is bank failures.  Bank failures arise in extreme cases in which 
bank health has deteriorated dramatically.    However, the number of bank failures was 
highly limited.  In addition, during the period of financial turbulence in Japan, small 
firms could get financial support from the government when their main banks failed.  
The measure may thus capture the impacts of catastrophic but very rare events on bank 
health deterioration.    For comparison, we also explore the impacts of defaults of parent 
companies and major trade partners in the following analysis.    For smaller firms, loans 
from parent companies and other major trading partners sometimes substitute for 
short-term bank loans.  The comparison might focus on the health deterioration 
impacts of substitutable loan suppliers.     
 
 
3. The Model and the Data 
(1) The Multinomial Probit Model 
To test our hypothesis, we estimate a trinomial-probit model as well as a 
binomial-probit model based on (unbalanced) panel data from Japanese unlisted 
companies.  When estimating the trinomial-probit model, we divide the firms into 
three categories: (A) firms that went bankrupt for liquidation purposes, (B) firms that 
went bankrupt for reconstruction purposes, and (C) firms that did not go bankrupt.  
Let individual firm i choose among a set of mutually exclusive alternatives: Category A, 
B, and C.  Assume that the (unobserved) latent variable for Category A, B, and C is 
expressed as linear functions of explanatory variables 
 
yAit* = α + β’x it + γ’z it + εA it, 
yBit* = δ +λ’ x it + φ’z it + εB it,        ( 1 )  
yCit* = 0, 
 
where x  it is a k×1 vector of financial variables, zit is a m×1 vector of bank health 
measures, β and λ are k×1 coefficient vectors, γ and φ are m×1 coefficient vectors, and i 
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t o  b e  z e r o .   ( εA it,  εB it) is a vector of alternative-specific disturbances that follow 












         ( 2 )  
 
Category A is chosen if yAit* ≥ yBit* and yAit* ≥ yCit*, Category B is chosen if yBit* > yAit* 
and yBit* > yCit*, and Category C is chosen otherwise.  We can thus define the trinomial 
probit model as follows 
 
yAit = 1    if α + β’x it + γ’z it + εA it ≥ δ +λ’ x it + φ’z it + εB it and α + β’x it + γ’z it + εA it ≥ 0, 
   =  0  otherwise, 
yBit = 1    if δ +λ’ x it + φ’z it + εB it > α + β’x it + γ’z it + εA it and δ +λ’ x it + φ’z it + εB it > 0,     
        =   0     o t h e r w i s e ,           ( 3 )    
yCit = 1    if α + β’x it + γ’z it + εA it < 0 and δ +λ’ x it + φ’z it + εB it ≤ 0, 
     =   0   o t h e r w i s e ,  
 
where y Ait = 1 if the company went bankrupt for liquidation purposes, yBit = 1 if the 
company went bankrupt for reconstruction purposes, and yCit = 1 if the company did not 
go bankrupt. 
It is easy to see that when α = δ, β =λ, γ = φ, and ε
A
 it = ε
B
 it, the trinomial probit model is 
degenerated into a standard binomial probit model where either Category A or Category 
B is chosen if yAit* = yBit* > yCit* and Category C is chosen otherwise.  When estimating 
the binomial-probit model, we divide the firms into two categories: (a) firms that went 
bankrupt and (b) firms that did not go bankrupt.
 
(2) Data of Financial Variables 
The explanatory vector xit denotes a vector of financial variables of unlisted 
companies.  For the financial variables, we use “debt-asset ratio,” “interest 
payments-output ratio,” “profits-asset ratio,” and “special losses-asset ratio.”  The 
choice of the variables follows several previous studies in Japan.    We define “debt-asset 
ratio,” “profits-asset ratio,” and “special losses-asset ratio” as total outstanding bank 
borrowings, operating profits, and special losses respectively, normalized by total assets.   
We also define “interest payments-output ratio” as total interest payments divided by 
total sales plus liquid assets.   
 9Bankruptcy is usually triggered by default on debt servicing.  A company is thus 
more likely to fail if it is unprofitable and highly leveraged.    For firms with low growth 
opportunities, high leverage reduces a firm’s ability to finance investment through a 
liquidity effect.  In extreme cases, a firm’s debt overhang could be large enough to 
prevent it from raising funds to finance positive net present value projects.    In contrast, 
a company with a healthy cash-flow has relatively easy access to internal finance, so it 
is less likely to go bankrupt than a company with cash-flow problems.  We therefore 
expect that a firm is likely to have a larger default risk when it has a larger debt-asset 
ratio, larger interest payments, smaller profits, and larger special losses. 
We collected the firm-level financial data of Japanese non-financial firms that are no  
listed on any stock exchange in Japan.    The data are taken from TSR Database Service.   
Unless the data are incomplete, the data set covers the period from 1996 through 2002.   
The data cover all available financial data of non-financial corporations with capital in 
excess of 100 million yen.  We, however, excluded the data of public firms, non-profit 
organizations, firms that had no borrowings from banks, and firms for which relevant 
financial variables are missing.    It allows us to use the data of 6,266 Japanese unlisted 
firms.  Among those, 150 went bankrupt for 
t
reconstruction purposes and 168 for 
liquidation purposes from 1997 to 2003.     
One may argue that we should use not only the data of medium-size firms but also the 
data of smaller ones.  The use of smaller-size firms’ data may provide some useful 
information because the smaller firms have stronger reliance on bank finance, and face 
higher default risk.    The accounting data of smaller unlisted firms, however, are likely 
to be missing, and are thus less reliable.    It’s clear that both costs and benefits exist in 
using the data of smaller size firms in the analysis. 
Table 1-1 reports the average, standard deviation, maximum, and minimum of each 
financial variable for all firms and bankrupt firms in our sampled unlisted companies.  
We see that “debt-asset ratio,” “interest payments-output ratio,” and “special 
losses-asset ratio” are higher for bankrupt firms, while “profits-asset ratio” is much 
smaller for bankrupt firms.   The simple comparison supports the view that a company 
is more likely to fail if it is unprofitable, highly leveraged, and suffers cash-flow 
difficulties. 
Table 1-2 reports the corresponding data of 2,138 listed companies in Japan.  “Debt- 
asset ratio” and “interest payments-output ratio” are on average higher for our unlisted 
companies than for the listed companies. Standard deviation of “debt-asset ratio” is, 
however, larger for the unlisted companies.  “Profits-asset ratio” and “special 
losses-asset ratio” are smaller for our unlisted companies.    However, when we focus on 
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negligible for each financial variable. 
 
(3) Bank Health Data 
The explanatory vector zit denotes a vector of several alternative measures on 
financial health of the “main banks.”  As for the three alternative measures of bank 
health, we constructed the data by the following steps.    First, we identified the name of 
the firm’s lenders based on CD Eyes, supplied by TSR Database Service.  Like the 
Japan Company Handbook, CD Eyes provides a list of major lenders for each unlisted 
company.  The order of the listed lenders is based on how close the bank-firm 
relationships are.    We defined the “main bank” as the bank that appears first in the list.   
We then collected the relevant financial data of the “main banks” from Financial 
Statements of All Banks, published by the Japan Bankers Association.  The data set 
covers the period from 1996 through 2003. 
To calculate a proxy for ratios of NPLs, we use risk management loans divided by 
total assets.  Using the standards set by the Federation of Bankers Associations of 
Japan, each bank discloses the amount of “risk management loans” each year.  Risk 
management loans are comprised of “past due loans” in arrears by three months or 
more, and “restructured loans” with changes in terms and conditions, as well as loans to 
borrowers in legal bankruptcy.  For large banks, the standards after 1998 became 
comparable to the United States SEC standards adopted for the public disclosure of bad 
loans.  However, the standards—which cover a wider range of non-performing 
loans—were different before 1998.  Moreover, the definition of risk management loans 
changed frequently for other smaller banks (that is, regional banks, second regional 
banks, Shinkin Banks, and Shinyo Kumiai).  In calculating the NPL ratios, we thus 
use only those of the major banks (that is, city banks, trust banks, and long-term credit 
banks) and distinguish those before and after 1998 as two different variables in the 
analysis. 
The relative stock valuation we use in the following analysis is the logged difference 
of the bank’s stock price between the end of each year and the end of 1990.  We took 
1990 as a benchmark year because the Japanese stock market crashed in early 1991.  
Because of availability, the data cover only those for listed banks, although most of the 
main banks are listed ones in our sample.    We excluded stock valuation of failed banks 
in the analysis, even when they were kept listed in the stock market.  We added a 
dummy to the main banks for which stock prices are missing. 
We capture the impacts of bank failures by a dummy variable.  The bank failure 
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“bank failure” follows the Financial Services Agency in Japan.  It only includes banks 
that the government declared insolvent.  During the period of financial turbulence, 
small firms could have financial support from the government when the government 
identified that their main banks failed in Japan.  Therefore, although a bank failure 
would arise in an extreme case in which the bank’s health deteriorated dramatically, 
their impacts on small firms might be ambiguous.   For comparison, we also explore 
the impacts of defaults of parent companies and major trade partners in the analysis. 
CD Eyes provides a list of parent companies and major trading partners for each 
unlisted company.  Some of the companies in the list are unlisted companies.  We, 
however, use only listed companies as parent companies and major trading partners 
because reverse causality from the unlisted firm will be less of a problem when parent 
companies and major trading partners are listed firms.  Default information of parent 
companies and major trade partners is based on data from the Tokyo Shoko Research 
(TSR) Database Service.     
Table 2 reports types of the “main” banks and distributions of the number of lending 
bank lenders.  It states that nearly 60 percent of the “main” banks are either city 
banks, long-term credit banks, or trust banks, and 28 percent of the “main” banks are 
first regional banks.  This implies that large listed banks still play dominant roles as 
“main” banks, even for most unlisted medium-size firms in our sample. 
Table 3 reports basic statistics (i.e., average, standard deviation, minimum, and 
maximum) of NPL ratios and the relative stock valuation for the “main” banks.  The 
average of NPL ratios amounts to 4.09 percent during our sample period.  The 
standard deviation of NPL ratios is also high, implying that ratios of NPLs that were 
well above 10 percent for several banks.  On average, NPL ratios tend to be higher for 
bankrupt firms than for surviving ones, while the stock valuation is smaller for 
bankrupt firms.     
 
 
4. Empirical Results 
(1) Impacts of the Selected Financial Variables 
Table 4 summarizes the estimation results of our binomial and trinomial probit 
models.  To allow industry-specific factors, it reports the results with industrial 
dummies.  Before looking at the bank health effects, we check whether the selected 
financial variables have sensible impacts on probabilities of bankruptcies in the table.  
“Debt-asset ratio,” “interest payments-output ratio,” and “special losses-asset ratio” 
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impacts are statistically significant in increasing bankruptcy  probability in the 
binomial probit model.  The results are consistent with previous empirical evidence in 
that a firm is likely to have a larger default risk when it has a larger debt-output ratio, 
larger interest payments, and smaller profits.  Among the selected financial variables, 
“profits-asset ratio” had the largest impact in magnitude. “Debt-asset ratio” had the 
second-largest. 
Even in the trinomial probit model, “debt-asset ratio” and “interest payments-output 
ratio” are statistically significant  in increasing bankruptcy  probability for both 
reconstruction and liquidation purposes.  “Debt-asset ratio” had a larger impact for 
liquidation purposes.  Reflecting the fact that interest payments are suspended for 
troubled firms, “interest payments-output ratio,” however, had a larger impact for 
reconstruction purposes.  “Special losses-asset ratio” is, in contrast, statistically 
significant only for liquidation purposes.    This may imply that large capital losses were 
a source of liquidation for troubled firms.  “Profits-asset ratio” had the largest impact 
in the magnitude.  But its significance level is marginal, which is a reflection of the 
heterogeneous impacts.   
As for the dummy variables, some of the industry dummies have statistically 
significant impacts.    In particular, the dummy for the construction industry always has 
a significantly positive impact, while those for the transportation and communication 
industries always have a significantly negative impact.    The dummy for unlisted banks 
is positive but is not statistically significant.     
 
(2)    The Impacts of the Alternative Measures of Bank Health 
More interesting results are observed when we look at the impacts of the three 
alternative measures of bank health: (i) ratios of NPLs, (ii) a relative bank stock 
valuation, and (iii) bank failures.  It is easy to see that both NPL ratios and stock 
valuation have expected impacts on a borrower’s probability of bankruptcy, even when 
observable characteristics relating to these borrower’s financial variables are controlled.   
That is, the coefficient of the stock valuation took a negative sign, while those of NPL 
ratios took a positive sign.  This implies that the impaired bank health measures 
tightened the bank’s lending attitude, and consequently increased the borrower’s 
default risk in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
Both of the NPL ratios before and after 1998 had statistically significant impacts in 
increasing probabilities in the binomial probit model.  Solving the non-performing 
loans problems was regarded as an important indicator to recover confidence in the 
 13Japanese financial system.  It is thus highly possible that the banks’ attempts to 
improve these ratios increased the borrowers’ default risk through the tightening of 
lending.  The alternative measures on NPL ratios, however, had different impacts in 
the trinomial probit model, although they always took expected sign.  The NPL ratios 
before 1998 had significant impacts only for liquidation purposes, while the NPL ratios 
after 1998 had significant impacts only for reconstruction purposes. 
The relative stock valuation had a statistically significant negative impact in 
increasing bankruptcy probability in the binomial probit model.    The stock valuation is 
an indicator that reflects the forward-looking market valuation of the banks.  The 
result implies that a decline in the market valuation of the bank increased the 
borrower’s  bankruptcy  probability.  The stock valuation is, however, statistically 
significant only for reconstruction purposes in the trinomial probit model.     
Finally, failures of the main bank always had an expected positive impact, which was 
significant for reconstruction purposes in the trinomial model.  However, the impact 
was statistically less significant in the binomial model.  The impact may be less 
significant partly because the number of bank failures was very small in our sample.8  
It may also reflect the fact that small firms could have financial support from the 
government when the government identified that their main banks failed in Japan.    In 
the late 1990s and early 2000s, the credit guarantee system provided special business 
stabilization guarantees (safety net guarantees) to small and medium companies when 
correspondent financial institutions went bankrupt.  The less-significant impacts may 
provide indirect evidence that the credit guarantee system mitigated the costs of bank 
failures in the late 1990s and early 2000s.  Defaults of parent companies and major 
trade partners, in contrast, had significant impacts in increasing bankruptcy 
probability for reconstruction purposes.    The impacts are particularly large for defaults 
of parent companies.  This may reflect the fact that small firms might not have 
financial supports from the government even when their parent companied defaulted. 
 
 
5. Interpretations of the Marginal Impacts 
In the last section, we showed that the bank health measures, as well as defaults of 
parent companies and major trade partners, had expected impacts on a borrower’s 
probability of bankruptcy, even when observable characteristics relating to these 
borrower’s financial variables are controlled.  In a bank-centered system like Japan, 
                                                  
8 In Japan, the number of bank failures had been very small because a number of 
distressed banks are merged out under regulatory assistance. 
 14poor bank performance should be more costly for smaller firms that obtain most of their 
external financing from the bank with which they’ve established a relationship.  It is 
thus highly possible that small and medium firms that relied more on bank finance 
faced significantly large default risk when bank health deteriorated.  Our empirical 
results clearly support this view. 
The estimated coefficients, however, suggest that marginal impacts vary across 
different explanatory variables, especially in the trinomial probit model.  The purpose 
of this section is to explore the different impacts each bank health measure had in 
increasing two types of bankruptcies.  In the analysis, we define a hypothetical 
“average firm” that takes the average values of all financial variables and bank health 
measures among the sampled firms that had one of the major banks as the main bank 
after 1998.    We then investigate how the probability of bankruptcy of the average firm 
would increase when each of the health measures deteriorated. 
Table 5 summarizes the results.    It reports the changes of the bankruptcy probability 
when the NPL ratios after 1998 increased by one percentage point, or when the relative 
stock valuation declined by one percent.   It also reports the changes of the bankruptcy 
probability when the main bank failed, when a trading partner defaulted, or when a 
parent company defaulted, respectively.  The NPL ratios and the relative stock 
valuation had similar impacts on the bankruptcy probability.  In the binomial probit 
model, the probability of bankruptcy would increase by 0.09 percentage points for every 
one-percent increase in NPL ratios, while it would increase by 0.11 percentage points if 
the relative stock valuation of the main bank decline by one percent.  The marginal 
impacts are relatively moderate.  The impacts are, however, far from negligible, 
undergoing financial turbulence where the NPL ratios piled up and the stock prices 
dropped dramatically.    They would have been critical under a financial crisis.     
The trinomial probit model shows that the marginal impacts on bankruptcy are more 
important for reconstruction purposes than for liquidation purposes.  The probability 
of bankruptcy for reconstruction purposes would increase by 0.08 percentage points for 
every one-percent increase of the NPL ratios, while it would increase by 0.07 percentage   
points for each one-percent decline of the relative stock valuation.  After 1998, the 
Financial Services Agency (FSA) established the basic guidelines for financial 
inspections and gradually started its strict financial inspections of banks.  Under the 
circumstances, the banks increased reconstruction of their troubled client firms when 
the amount of nonperforming loans piled up.  Moreover, because of their 
forward-looking properties, a decline in the stock price was a market signal that the 
Japanese bank would be in trouble in the near future.  Responding to the market 
 15signal, the bank might increase reconstruction of its troubled client firms to recover its 
market value. 
As for the marginal effects of the default dummies, a main bank failure and a major 
trading partner’s default had smaller impacts than did a parent company’s default.  
The impacts of the rare events on bankruptcy are, however, far from negligible for 
reconstruction purposes.  If the main bank fails, the probability of bankruptcy would 
increase by 0.59 percentage points for reconstruction purposes, while it would increase 
only by 0.07 percentage points for liquidation purposes.  If the major trading partner 
defaults, the probability of bankruptcy would increase by 0.59 percentage points for 
reconstruction purposes, while it would increase only by 0.21 percentage points for 
liquidation purposes.   
The table suggests that the catastrophic effects are very large when a parent 
company defaults.  If one of the parent companies defaults, the probability of 
bankruptcy would increase by 3.58 percentage points in the binomial probit model.    In 
the trinomial model, the probability of bankruptcy for reconstruction purposes would 
increase by 3.36 percentage points.    The impacts are extremely significant, particularly 
in increasing bankruptcy probability for reconstruction purposes.  This implies that 
the defaults of parent firms had contagious effects in increasing default risk of vertically 
related smaller firms in the late 1990s and early 2000s in Japan. 
It is noteworthy that all of the default dummies had larger marginal effects on 
bankruptcy for reconstruction purposes than those for liquidation purposes.  This 
probably reflects the fact that main bank failures as well as defaults of trading partners 
or parent companies are external shocks that are not directly related to the financial 
health of the unlisted firms.  The external shocks increase default risk of the unlisted 
firms.  When they are not accompanied by health deterioration of the unlisted firms, 
however, it is likely that the firms choose bankruptcy for reconstruction purposes rather 
than for liquidation purposes. 
 
 
6.    The Role of Multiple Banking Relationships 
The benefits from a bank-borrower relationship stem mainly from having a single 
bank with proprietary information about the borrower, which may make more credit 
available at lower cost.  Therefore, other things being equal, borrowing from multiple 
banks may be costly (higher transaction costs, duplicated effort, free-rider problem, etc.) 
and informationally inefficient relative to relationship lending by a single bank.    Firms 
may, however, benefit from multiple banks to avoid a “hold-up” problem, in which a 
 16single bank may exploit its market power and extract excessive rents.    In particular, to 
the extent that a borrower faces switching costs in a relationship with an individual 
bank, it would be costly to borrow from a single lender if its primary bank is in financial 
distress.  This implies that default risk would be more sensitive to our bank health 
measures if the bank-firm relationship is close. 
In this section, we examine these implications based on our probit models.  To 
measure a favorable impact of a close bank-borrower relationship, we include the 
number of bank lenders in the last period as an explanatory variable.  To the extent 
that a close bank-borrower relationship has a role in reducing the costs of financial 
distress for borrowers, we expect that the number of bank lenders in the previous period 
will have a positive impact on the bankruptcy probability.  We also add a coefficient 
dummy of multiple banking relationships to NPL ratios, one of our bank health 
measures.  The coefficient dummy takes one if the number of its bank lenders in the 
last period is equal to or greater than three, and zero otherwise.  To the extent that a 
close bank-borrower relationship exacerbates a “hold-up” problem, the coefficient 
dummy would reduce the impact of bank health deterioration on the bankruptcy 
probability.  We thus expect that the coefficient dummy has a negative sign for the 
NPL ratios. 
Table 6 summarizes the estimation results of our probit models.  The table reports 
the case in which we add the coefficient dummy to the NPL ratios after 1998.  As in 
Table 4, “debt-asset ratio,” “interest payments-output ratio,” and “special losses-asset 
ratio” have positive impacts, while “profits-asset ratio” has negative impacts.  Without 
the coefficient dummy, the impacts of the three alternative measures of the bank health 
are also similar to those in Table 4.  The inclusion of the number of bank lenders and 
the coefficient dummy did not change our basic results. 
More interesting results are, however, observed when we look at the impacts of the 
number of bank lenders.  The number of bank lenders itself has a significant positive 
impact on the bankruptcy probability.  This implies that, given the bank health 
measures, a close bank-firm relationship reduces the probability of bankruptcy.  The 
implication is reconfirmed in Figure 3, which shows the percentages of bankrupt firms 
for each number of bank lenders.    When the number of bank lenders is less than three, 
the percentage of bankrupt firms is less than 0.52, even for all bankruptcies.    When the 
number is between four and five, the percentage goes up to 0.9, but is still less than one.   
However, when the number exceeds six, the percentage is always greater than one.    In 
particular, when the number of bank lenders is 10, the percentage exceeds two.  The 
results are essentially the same even if we classify the types of bankruptcies into two 
 17categories.    One may argue a possibility of reverse causality, that default risk increases 
the number of bank lenders.  However, the number of bank lenders is highly stable 
over time; it is very rare that firms switch lending banks.    It is thus very unlikely that 
firms increased lenders when they face unexpected financial distress during our short 
time span. 
In Table 6, the coefficient dummy of NPL ratios, in contrast, reduces the impact of 
bank health deterioration on the bankruptcy probability.  The sign of each coefficient 
dummy was negative, although its significance level is marginal.  This implies that 
when various measures of bank health deteriorated, multiple banking relationships 
would mitigate the tightened bank’s lending attitude, and reduce borrowers’ default risk 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
The result implies that multiple bank relationships might have both costs and 
benefits.  They are costly when they cause too much competition ex post, which may 
discourage lending to small and medium firms that have few alternative sources of 
funding.  They are, however, beneficial when they reduce the value of information 
acquisition to any one individual bank, which avoids the hold-up problem. 
 
 
7. Predictability of the Model 
In this paper, we have found that several measures of bank-specific financial health 
as well as borrower’s financial variables have significant impacts on a borrower’s 
probability of bankruptcy.  Highly significant coefficients in the probit models suggest 
the usefulness of our approach in predicting a borrower’s default risk under impaired 
bank health.  The purpose of this section is to explore some predictability of our 
binomial probit model in detecting borrower’s bankruptcies.  Economic  models  usually 
show poor performance in predicting rare events (see, for example, Greene’s [2003] 
p.685).    Since the average bankruptcy rate is only 1.0% in our sample, our probit models 
also tended to show relatively low bankruptcy probabilities, even for bankrupt firms.  
However, several alternative performance measures show the usefulness of our model 
in predicting bankruptcies. 
First, when we compare ex-ante bankruptcy probabilities between bankrupt firms 
and non-bankrupt firms, our probit model on average shows much higher bankruptcy 
probability for bankrupt firms than for non-bankrupt firms.  For example, in the 
binomial model in Section 6, average ex-ante bankruptcy probability is 3.35% for 
bankrupt firms and 1.00% for non-bankrupt firms.  The average predicted probability 
 18for bankrupt firms is more than three times that for non-bankrupt firms.9   
Second, when we compare bankruptcy probabilities of individual firms, the ex-ante 
bankruptcy probability exceeds 1% (that is, average bankruptcy rate) for most bankrupt 
firms but does not for most non-bankrupt firms.  Figure 4 shows a histogram of 
bankruptcy probabilities predicted by the binomial model in Section 6.    It is easy to see 
that distribution in the histogram is almost flat for bankrupt firms but is highly skewed 
toward zero for non-bankrupt firms.  The percentage of firms whose ex-ante 
bankruptcy probability is more than 5% is 19% among bankrupt firms but only 2% 
among non-bankrupt firms.  In contrast, the percentage of firms whose ex-ante 
bankruptcy probability is below 1% is only 22% among bankrupt firms but 68% among 
non-bankrupt firms.  Since average bankruptcy probability is 1.0% in our sample, this 
implies that firms whose bankruptcy probability exceeds the average bankruptcy rate 
are likely to default in the next period. 
Third, the inclusion of bank-specific financial health measures improves the 
predictability of our probit models.  We can see this by comparing performance of our 
binomial probit model in Section 6 with and without bank-specific financial health 
measures.10  When we estimate the model without bank-specific financial health 
measures, average ex-ante bankruptcy probability drops from 3.35% to 2.64% for 
bankrupt firms while it goes up from 1.00% to 1.01% for non-bankrupt firms.   Without 
bank-specific financial health measures, the share of firms whose ex-ante bankruptcy 
probability exceeds 5% drops from 19% to 10% among bankrupt firms, while the share 
of firms whose ex-ante bankruptcy probability is below 2% goes up from 48% to 53% 
among bankrupt firms.  The inclusion of bank-specific financial health measures is 




In this paper, we investigated how various measures of bank health and how defaults 
of major trading partners affected the probability of bankruptcy among medium-size 
firms in Japan.  Using probit models, we found that several measures of bank-specific 
financial health have significant impacts on a borrower’s probability of bankruptcy, 
                                                  
9 In the experiment, non-bankrupt firms include firms that survived in the present year 
but defaulted in the following years.    If we focus solely on these firms, average ex-ante 
bankruptcy probability goes up to 2.09%.    The average predicted probability is more 
than twice that of the other non-bankrupt firms. 
10 The model without bank-specific financial health measures excludes three bank 
health measures and defaults of parent companies and a major trade partner from its 
explanatory variables. 
 19even when observable characteristics relating to these borrower’s financial variables 
are controlled.  The inclusion of bank-specific financial health measures was useful in 
providing warning messages for possible bankruptcies in the next period. 
After the collapse of the Japanese stock market in the early 1990s, the Japanese 
banking sector began to face considerable problems, many of which limited its ability to 
renew loans and to extend new loans to firms.    The problems became especially serious 
in the late 1990s, when several major financial institutions turned out to be in default.  
If firms are highly dependent on obtaining funds from banks with which they have a 
historical relationship, one would expect that firms that relied more on finance from 
troubled banks suffered significantly larger default risks.  Our empirical results 
support this view, particularly for the firms with a close banking relationship, using the 
firm-level data of unlisted Japanese companies in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
In his survey article, Boot (2000) pointed out that banking relationships have 
negative effects not only with respect to the hold-up problem but also for the soft-budget 
constraint problem.    A bank with an impaired balance-sheet might attempt to “gamble 
for resurrection” and hence might increase risky lending to zombie firms.  The banks 
could reduce the reported amount of nonperforming loans on their books and inflate 
their reported capital, as long as it makes sufficient credit available to the firm to 
enable it to make interest payments on the outstanding loans from the bank. 
Consequently, a bank may continue lending to troubled firms to provide sufficient 
financing to keep otherwise economically bankrupt firms alive.  Some recent studies 
supported the view for listed firms (for example, Peek and Rosengren  [2003]).  However, 
our results suggest that the view is less likely to hold for unlisted firms.  Unlisted 
firms in our sample are too small for troubled banks to gamble for resurrection.    Rather, 
it is possible that smaller firms’ ability to raise external financing was impaired, and 
became more likely to default when the financial condition of Japanese banks 
deteriorated.   
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 22Table 1-1    Basic Statistics of the Financial Data: The Case of Unlisted Firms   
 
ɹɹɹ         ɹ(%)
all firms bankrupt firms
Debt/total asset                     ʢaverageʣ 43.10 65.63
ɹɹɹɹɹ         ʢstandard deviationʣ 37.92 37.62
ɹɹɹɹɹ                          ʢmaximumʣ 2846.30 358.18
ɹɹɹɹɹ                          ʢminimumʣ 0.00 9.79
Special Loss/total asset        ʢaverageʣ 2.34 6.18
ɹɹɹɹɹ         ʢstandard deviationʣ 8.57 21.26
ɹɹɹɹɹ                          ʢmaximumʣ 507.61 242.92
ɹɹɹɹɹ                          ʢminimumʣ 0.00 0.00
Interest Payments/Output       (average) 0.88 1.50
ɹɹɹɹɹ         ʢstandard deviationʣ 2.44 1.83
ɹɹɹɹɹ                          ʢmaximumʣ 239.20 21.29
ɹɹɹɹɹ                          ʢminimumʣ 0.00 0.00
Profits/total asset                  ʢaverageʣ 2.45 0.21
ɹɹɹɹɹ        ʢstandard deviationʣ 5.92 7.13
ɹɹɹɹɹ                          ʢmaximumʣ 63.54 17.67
ɹɹɹɹɹ                          ʢminimumʣ -235.01 -82.74   
 
Notes 1) The number of firms is 6,266, of which 318 firms went bankrupt. 
         2) The sample period is 1997 to 2003. 
            3) The data of bankrupt firms are those of a year ahead of their bankruptcies. 
 
Source: TSR Database Service.   
 23Table 1-2    Basic Statistics of the Financial Data: The Case of Listed firms 
 
ɹ         ɹɹɹ(%)
all firms bankrupt firms
Debt/total asset                      ʢaverageʣ 33.21 45.00
ɹɹɹɹɹ         ʢstandard deviationʣ 86.33 23.25
ɹɹɹɹɹ                          ʢmaximumʣ 4638.80 160.71
ɹɹɹɹɹ                          ʢminimumʣ 0.01 4.94
Special Loss/total asset        ʢaverageʣ 3.24 8.80
ɹɹɹɹɹ         ʢstandard deviationʣ 8.36 15.21
ɹɹɹɹɹ                          ʢmaximumʣ 324.06 74.31
ɹɹɹɹɹ                          ʢminimumʣ 0.00 0.01
Interest Payments/Output      (average) 0.43 1.15
ɹɹɹɹɹ         ʢstandard deviationʣ 0.42 0.75
ɹɹɹɹɹ                          ʢmaximumʣ 7.74 4.27
ɹɹɹɹɹ                          ʢminimumʣ 0.00 0.18
Profits/total asset                 ʢaverageʣ 4.46 -0.04
ɹɹɹɹɹ         ʢstandard deviationʣ 12.21 2.61
ɹɹɹɹɹ                          ʢmaximumʣ 485.98 7.56
ɹɹɹɹɹ                          ʢminimumʣ -110.60 -6.73  
 
Notes 1) The number of firms is 2,138, of which 63 firms went bankrupt. 
         2) The sample period is 1996 to 2001. 
            3) The data of bankrupt firms are those of a year ahead of their bankruptcies. 
 
Source: Japan Development Bank Company Database. 
 24  Table 2    Types of Main Banks 
 
City, Trust, Long-term Credit Banks 57.16
First Regional Banks 27.91
Second Regional Banks 4.09
Shinkin and Shinkumi 5.38
Unknown 5.44  
 
 
Table 3    Basic Statistics of Main Banks 
 
all firms bankrupt firms
NLP ratio (%)                                  (average) 4.09 4.49
ɹɹɹɹɹ                   ʢstandard deviationʣ 3.18 3.29
          ɹɹ             ʢmaximumʣ 33.97 33.97
ɹɹɹɹɹ                                ʢminimumʣ 1.43 1.43
Relative measure of stock valuation   ʢaverageʣ -0.86 -1.01
ɹɹɹɹɹ                   ʢstandard deviationʣ 0.87 0.93
ɹɹɹɹɹ                               ʢmaximumʣ 0.22 0.00
ɹɹɹɹɹ                                ʢminimumʣ -3.52 -3.27  
 
Note: The relative measure of stock valuation is the logged difference of the stock price 
from the benchmark year of 1990.
 25Table 4-1    Estimation Result of the Binomial Probit Model 
 
              Coef. standard err.
Const. 0.23 (0.61)
Debt/asset  0.50 *** (0.06)
Special Loss/asset 0.04 *** (0.01)
Interest Payments/Output 0.17 *** (0.03)
Profits/asset  -1.13 ** (0.53)
NPL ratio ( 96-97 ) 0.12 *** (0.04)
NPL ratio ( 98-02 ) 0.06 * (0.03)
Difference of log ( Stock price )      -0.08 ** (0.03)
Main bank default dummy 0.24 (0.18)
Major trading partner default dummy 0.35 *** (0.09)
Parent company default dummy 0.82 *** (0.22)
Industry dummy ( Construction ) 0.34 *** (0.06)
Industry dummy ( Manufacture ) -0.21 *** (0.06)
Industry dummy ( Communication and Transportation ) -0.59 *** (0.15)
Industry dummy ( Real estate ) -0.26 *** (0.10)
Industry dummy ( Service ) -0.27 *** (0.10)
Main bank  unknown  dummy 0.01 (0.12)
Unlisted bank  dummy 0.03 (0.07)  
 
 
Table 4-2    Estimation Result of the Multinomial Probit Model 
 (B) Reconstruction  (A) Liquidation   ɹɹ
              Coef. standard err.               Coef. standard err.
Const. 0.09 (0.73) -0.40 (0.81)
Debt/asset  0.30 *** (0.09) 0.57 *** (0.07)
Special Loss/asset 0.02 (0.02) 0.05 *** (0.02)
Interest Payments/Output 0.27 *** (0.04) 0.09 ** (0.04)
Profits/asset  -1.09 * (0.63) -0.97 (0.70)
NPL ratio ( 96-97 ) 0.02 (0.06) 0.17 *** (0.05)
NPL ratio ( 98-02 ) 0.09 ** (0.04) 0.03 (0.04)
Difference of log ( Stock price )      -0.08 * (0.04) -0.06 (0.04)
Main bank default dummy 0.41 * (0.24) 0.09 (0.23)
Major trading partner default dummy 0.42 *** (0.10) 0.22 * (0.12)
Parent company default dummy 1.00 *** (0.24) 0.46 (0.34)
Industry dummy ( Construction ) 0.29 *** (0.09) 0.33 *** (0.08)
Industry dummy ( Manufacture ) -0.09 (0.08) -0.31 *** (0.08)
Industry dummy ( Communication and Transportation ) -0.50 *** (0.19) -0.64 *** (0.21)
Industry dummy ( Real estate ) -0.43 *** (0.15) -0.16 (0.12)
Industry dummy ( Service ) -0.15 (0.12) -0.41 *** (0.14)
Main bank  unknown  dummy -0.01 (0.16) 0.02 (0.17)
Unlisted bank  dummy 0.13 (0.09) -0.07 (0.09)
rho ( correlation coef. ) 0.31 (0.49)  
 
Notes 1) ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
       2)  The  number  of  samples  is  31,000. 
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             (%  point)





NPL ratio ( 98-02 ) 0.09
Difference of log ( Stock price )      -0.11
Main bank default dummy 0.49
Major trading partner default dummy 0.81
Parent company default dummy 3.58  
 
 
Table 5-2    Marginal Effects (Multinomial Probit Model) 
             (%  point)
    Reconstruction          Liquidation
Debt/asset  0.24 0.41
Special Loss/asset 0.02 0.04
Interest Payments/Output 0.22 0.06
Profits/asset  -0.88 -0.69
NPL ratio ( 98-02 ) 0.08 0.02
Difference of log ( Stock price )      -0.07 -0.04
Main bank default dummy 0.59 0.07
Major trading partner default dummy 0.59 0.21
Parent company default dummy 3.36 0.58  
 
 27Table 6-1    Binomial Probit Model with the Number of Bank Lenders 
              Coef. standard err.
Const. -0.32 (0.65)
Debt/asset  0.51 *** (0.06)
Special Loss/asset 0.04 *** (0.01)
Interest Payments/Output 0.17 *** (0.03)
Profits/asset  -1.19 ** (0.54)
NPL ratio ( 96-97 ) 0.11 *** (0.04)
NPL ratio ( 98-02 ) 0.30 * (0.17)
Coef. Dummy of  NPL ratio -0.25 (0.17)
Difference of log ( Stock price )      -0.08 ** (0.03)
Dummy of the bank lenders' number  0.61 *** (0.19)
Main bank default dummy 0.23 (0.19)
Major trading partner default dummy 0.36 *** (0.09)
Parent company default dummy 0.81 *** (0.22)
Industry dummy ( Construction ) 0.35 *** (0.06)
Industry dummy ( Manufacture ) -0.20 *** (0.06)
Industry dummy ( Communication and Transportation ) -0.59 *** (0.15)
Industry dummy ( Real estate ) -0.24 ** (0.10)
Industry dummy ( Service ) -0.25 ** (0.10)
Main bank  unknown  dummy -0.01 (0.12)
Unkisted bank dummy 0.03 (0.07) 
 
Table 6-2    Multinomial Probit Model with the Number of Bank Lenders 
 (B) Reconstruction  (A) Liquidation   ɹɹ
              Coef. standard err.               Coef. standard err.
Const. -0.37 (0.80) -0.96 (0.84)
Debt/asset  0.30 *** (0.09) 0.58 *** (0.07)
Special Loss/asset 0.02 (0.02) 0.05 *** (0.02)
Interest Payments/Output 0.27 *** (0.04) 0.08 ** (0.04)
Profits/asset  -1.20 * (0.65) -0.98 (0.70)
NPL ratio ( 96-97 ) 0.01 (0.06) 0.17 *** (0.05)
NPL ratio ( 98-02 ) 0.15 (0.29) 0.36 * (0.19)
Coef. Dummy of  NPL ratio -0.04 (0.09) -0.35 * (0.20)
Difference of log ( Stock price )      -0.08 * (0.04) -0.06 (0.04)
Dummy of the bank lenders' number  0.62 ** (0.29) 0.56 ** (0.24)
Main bank default dummy 0.40 * (0.24) 0.09 (0.23)
Major trading partner default dummy 0.43 *** (0.10) 0.23 * (0.12)
Parent company default dummy 0.98 *** (0.24) 0.45 (0.34)
Industry dummy ( Construction ) 0.30 *** (0.09) 0.34 *** (0.08)
Industry dummy ( Manufacture ) -0.09 (0.08) -0.31 *** (0.08)
Industry dummy ( Communication and Transportation ) -0.50 *** (0.19) -0.64 *** (0.21)
Industry dummy ( Real estate ) -0.43 *** (0.15) -0.14 (0.12)
Industry dummy ( Service ) -0.14 (0.12) -0.39 *** (0.14)
Main bank  unknown  dummy -0.04 (0.16) 0.00 (0.16)
Unlisted bank dummy 0.13 (0.09) -0.07 (0.09)
rho ( correlation coef. ) 0.30 (0.48)  
 
Notes 1) ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
       2)  The  number  of  samples  is  31,000. 
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